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THE NONRACIST AND ANTIRACIST HISTORY 
OF FIREARMS PUBLIC CARRY REGULATION 
Mark Anthony Frassetto* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This term, the Supreme Court will consider New York State Rifle & Pistol 
Ass’n v. Bruen, a Second Amendment challenge to New York State’s concealed 
carry weapon licensing system.1 Bruen is the first major Second Amendment 
case that the Court will decide on the merits in more than a decade.2 Briefing by 
the plaintiffs and gun rights scholars has in large part focused on arguments that 
laws regulating the carrying of guns in public, as well as gun regulation more 
generally, were historically intended to discriminate against minority groups.3 
This argument is consistent with a broader effort in the conservative legal 
movement to tie conservative goals—using public funds to support parochial 
schools, prohibiting abortion, and banning affirmative action—to racial justice 
or minority rights.4 The argument essentially goes: present day gun laws are 
 
 *  Deputy Director Second Amendment History and Scholarship at Everytown for Gun 
Safety: Everytown Law. J.D. Georgetown University Law Center; B.A. Marquette University. I 
would like to thank Prof. Jake Charles, Prof. Joseph Blocher, Prof. Darrell Miller, Prof. Saul 
Cornell, Len Hong Kamdang and Carina Bentata Gryting for their helpful comments and guidance 
on this piece. All errors remain my own. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily 
represent the views of Everytown for Gun Safety.  
 1.  N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, No. 20-843 (U.S. Apr. 26, 2021), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/20-843.html 
[https://perma.cc/5DQT-ZLUY]. 
 2.  The last major Second Amendment case decided on the merits is McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); in 2020, the Court heard a challenge to New York City’s rules about 
transporting handguns, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1526 
(2020), but it dismissed the case as moot after changes in both municipal and state law.  
 3.  See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 2, 10–13, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, No. 
20-843 (U.S. July 13, 2021), 2021 WL 3017303; Brief for Amicus Curiae National African 
American Gun Ass’n, Inc. in Support of Petitioners at 2–11, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. 
Bruen, No. 20-843 (U.S. July 16, 2021), 2021 WL 3072862 [hereinafter Amicus Brief for 
NAAGA]. 
 4.  See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2259 (2020) (using anti-
Catholic history of Blaine Amendment to strike down Montana prohibition on funding religious 
schools); see also Melissa Murray, Race-ing Roe: Reproductive Justice, Racial Justice, and the 
Battle for Roe v. Wade, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2025, 2027–28, 2030–31, 2062–67 (2021) (discussing 
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unconstitutional because gun laws of the past were intended to discriminate. 
But the plaintiffs and gun rights scholars cherry-pick this history of expressly 
racist laws primarily from the antebellum and early Reconstruction South.5 
These states enacted broad restrictions on the rights of both enslaved persons 
and free people of color, including restrictions on the possession and carrying of 
firearms.6 In contrast, there is a long history of gun regulation across the country, 
including carry regulations, which has been applied to the general population 
without an intent to discriminate against minority groups. This tradition of gun 
regulation is the forebearer of modern gun laws, not historical laws targeted at 
minority groups. When assessing the historical scope of the Second 
Amendment, courts should look to this nonracist history, not cynical arguments 
about racist Southern laws. 
A word of caution before beginning: like many areas of the law, the 
relationship between race and firearms regulation across American history is an 
extremely complicated and context-specific issue. Several books have been 
written about it, and more scholarship needs to be done.7 This article does not 
purport to address the issue in its entirety. This piece also does not deny that 
some regulations were expressly racist or that discriminatory law enforcement 
has occurred. This piece does take issue with the gun lobby’s narrative that 
modern gun regulation, especially public carry regulation, is the product of, and 
primarily motivated by, racist traditions of the slave South. That view of history 
is clearly wrong. 
This article will first lay out the overwhelming tradition of nonracist8 gun 
laws, which are the predecessors to modern gun regulation. The article will then 
discuss how the originalist analysis should address explicitly racist historical 
laws and why courts should look to the nonracist history of gun regulation when 
assessing the scope of the Second Amendment right. 
 
efforts to tie abortion to eugenics); David Nakamura, Republicans Leverage Attention on Anti-




 5.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 9–13; Amicus Brief for NAAGA, supra note 3, at 
4–10. 
 6.  Race and Slavery Based, Repository of Historical Gun Laws, DUKE CTR. FOR FIREARMS 
L., https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/subjects/race-and-slavery-based/ [https://perma.cc/Y3LQ-S2BN]; 
see also Patrick J. Charles, Racist History and the Second Amendment: A Critical Commentary, 43 
CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2022) (manuscript at 10), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3897310 
[https://perma.cc/7X5Y-L75T]. 
 7.  See, e.g., JENNIFER CARLSON, POLICING THE SECOND AMENDMENT: GUNS, LAW 
ENFORCEMENT, AND THE POLITICS OF RACE (2020); STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THE RIGHT TO BEAR 
ARMS: A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OR A PRIVILEGE OF THE RULING CLASS? 
(2021); CAROL ANDERSON, THE SECOND: RACE AND GUNS IN A FATALLY UNEQUAL AMERICA 
(2021); PATRICK J. CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF GUN RIGHTS FROM COLONIAL 
MILITIAS TO CONCEALED CARRY (2018); NOAH SHUSTERMAN, ARMED CITIZENS: THE ROAD 
FROM ANCIENT ROME TO THE SECOND AMENDMENT (2020). 
 8.  By “nonracist” the author means both (1) not explicitly targeting minority groups in the 
statute’s text and (2) not intended to be applied solely or primarily to a minority group. In most 
cases a broader definition of nonracist—not perpetuating racial inequality—would also clearly 
apply, at least to the initial enactment and enforcement. 
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II. THE NONRACIST TRADITION OF PUBLIC CARRY REGULATION 
There is extensive historical evidence of laws regulating the carrying of 
weapons in public that were (1) racially neutral without evidence of racist intent; 
(2) applied only to the white population; or (3) enacted to apply neutrally but 
intended to protect the black population from racist attacks by whites. This 
history is more than sufficient to show that gun regulation in the United States 
has not been uniformly or even predominantly motivated by racism. 
The foundational weapon carry law passed by the English Parliament in 1328, 
the Statute of Northampton, applied to everyone, stating “no Man great nor 
small, of what Condition soever he be” should go armed.9 This broad restriction 
applied to all but “the King’s Servants in his presence, and his Ministers in 
executing of the King’s Precepts.”10 While there would have been little 
opportunity for racist enforcement in premodern England, the limited surviving 
enforcement records show the law being applied equitably across classes, with 
two cases where upper class members were prosecuted and two where the 
defendant was likely a commoner.11 This stood in contrast to later English 
weapon regulations, which did not make their way to the colonies, that applied 
unequally based on class.12 It also stood in contrast to the English Bill of Rights’ 
provision protecting the right to have arms, which was limited based on both 
religion and class.13 In the colonies, broad restrictions on carrying weapons 
similar to the Statute of Northampton were adopted,14 which applied to everyone 
and did not require a threat to “any person in particular” or “any particular act 
 
 9.  Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3 c. 3 (1328); see also Statutes for the City of London, 
13 Edw. 1 (1285) (“[N]one be so hardy to be found going or wandering about the Streets of the 
City, after Curfew tolled at St. Martins le Grand, with Sword or Buckler . . . .”). 
 10.  Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3 c. 3 (1328). Those who went armed could also be 
compelled to find sureties to keep the peace. Peace (1662) 83 Eng. Rep. 900; 1 Keble 203 (“[T]o 
go armed is good cause to bind him to good behaviour.”).  
 11.  For an upper class case, see EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND 
CRIMINAL CAUSES 162 (London, Miles Flesher 1648) (discussing arrest of Sir Thomas Figgett who 
“went armed under his garments, as well in the Palace, as before the Justices of the Kings Bench.”). 
See also Rex v. Sir John Knight (1686) 90 Eng. Rep. 330; Comberbach 39. For a not discernably 
upper class case, see Rex v. Harwood, Quarter Sessions at Malton (Oct. 4–5, 1608), in 1 North 
Riding Record Society, Quarter Sessions Records 132 (Rev. J.C. Atkinson ed., 1883) (discussing 
man arrested for committing “outragious misdemeanours” by going “armed” with “pistolls[] and 
other offensive weapons”). See also Middlesex Sessions: Justices’ Working Documents (1751), 
https://www.londonlives.org/browse.jsp?div=LMSMPS50410PS504100085 
[https://perma.cc/9EEU-DSMA] (noting prison time and a fine for “going Armed with a Cutlass 
Contrary to the Statute.”). 
 12.  22 & 23 Car. 2 c. 25, § 2 (1671) (prohibiting firearms possession for those with an annual 
income of less than 100 pounds). 
 13.  An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of 
the Crown, 1 W. & M. 2 c. 2 (1689) (“That the Subjects, which are Protestants may have Arms for 
their Defence suitable to their Conditions, and as allowed by Law.”). 
 14.  An Act Against Wearing Swords, etc., ch. 9, 1686 N.J. Laws 289, 290 (applying to 
“planters” who made up the vast majority of the population); An Act for the Punishing of Criminal 
Offenders, No. 6, 1694 Mass. Laws 12, https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/lawslaw/1694-mass-laws-12-
no-6-an-act-for-the-punishing-of-criminal-offenders/ [https://perma.cc/BE2B-JEW7] (allowing 
arrest of all “such as shall ride or go armed”). 
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of violence.”15 
The English tradition of generally prohibiting carrying weapons in public was 
modified by Massachusetts in 1836 to include an express exception for those 
carrying arms because of a specific need for self-defense.16 Massachusetts’s law 
was clearly not intended to target any minority group. The law was enacted as 
part of a wholesale revision of Massachusetts legal code drafted by a committee 
that was chaired by Horace Mann, famed education reformer and antislavery 
advocate.17 Among the code’s other provisions was a repeal of Massachusetts’s 
rarely used law prohibiting black immigration.18 Over the next few years, the 
Massachusetts model spread to Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and 
Minnesota.19 It also notably spread to Oregon and Virginia.20 In both states, the 
law would have only applied to the white population. Virginia had separate laws 
regulating firearms possession by enslaved persons and free blacks.21 Oregon’s 
law would have applied only to white residents because the state prohibited 
nonwhite immigration.22 The law also spread to Ohio, where abolitionist 
Republican Governor Salmon Chase signed a law that prohibited carrying 
concealed weapons except when the circumstances would “justify a prudent man 
in carrying [a] weapon.”23 Enforcement records indicate these laws were 
enforced as general prohibitions on going armed, regardless of race.24 
In a recent book chapter, George Mason law professor Robert Leider implies 
Massachusetts’s law was enforced in a discriminatory manner, pointing to an 
example of the law being enforced against black residents of the state.25 
 
 15.  Michael Treves, Note, A Call for Sensible Gun Reform Outside of the Home, N.Y.U. 
PROC. n.53 (April 15, 2019) (first quoting JAMES EWING, A TREATISE ON THE OFFICE AND DUTY 
OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 546 (n.p. 1805); and then citing JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 550 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 3d ed. 1865) (noting 
no requirement that “peace must actually be broken[] to lay the foundation for a criminal 
proceeding.”)), https://proceedings.nyumootcourt.org/2019/04/a-call-for-sensible-gun-reform-
outside-of-the-home/ [https://perma.cc/L5FY-AXV8]. 
 16.  Acts of Feb. 1836, ch. 134, § 16, 1836 Mass. Laws 748, 750. 
 17.  See id. at vi–vii; see also Lawrence A. Cremin, Horace Mann: American Educator, 
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Horace-Mann [https://perma.cc/CH33-
33TE] (noting that Horace Mann was an education advocate and “fierce enemy of slavery”) 
 18.  KATE MASUR, UNTIL JUSTICE BE DONE: AMERICA’S FIRST CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO RECONSTRUCTION 58 (2021). 
 19.  An Act to Prevent the Commission of Crimes, § 16, 1839 Wis. Sess. Laws 379, 381; Act 
of May 18, 1846, ch. 162, § 16, 1846 Mich. Pub. Acts 690, 692; Act of Sept. 1851, ch. 112, § 18, 
1851 Minn. Rev. Stat. 526, 528; Act of Mar. 31, 1860, § 6, 1860 Pa. Laws 248, 250. 
 20.  Act of Dec. 5, 1853, ch. 16, § 17, 1853 Or. Laws 218, 220; Act of Mar. 14, 1848, ch. 14, 
§ 16, 1848 Va. Acts 127, 129. 
 21.  An Act Concerning Free Negroes and Mulattoes, ch. 94, 1805 Va. Acts 51. 
 22.  Greg Nokes, Black Exclusion Laws in Oregon, OR. ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
https://www.oregonencyclopedia.org/articles/exclusion_laws/ [https://perma.cc/A7H8-7XW5] 
(July 6, 2020). 
 23.  An Act to Prohibit the Carrying or Wearing of Concealed Weapons, § 2, 1859 Ohio Laws 
56, 57. 
 24.  City Intelligence, BOS. COURIER, Mar. 7, 1853, at 4 (carrying a concealed pistol); Boston 
and Vicinity, BOS. J., Oct. 10, 1867, at 2 (concealed pistol); City Items, RICHMOND DAILY WHIG, 
Sept. 25, 1860, at 3 (sureties payment for carrying concealed weapons); City and Suburban, 
RICHMOND WHIG, Sept. 18, 1866 (peace bond for carrying concealed weapon). 
 25.  Robert Leider, Constitutional Liquidation, Surety Laws, and the Right to Bear Arms, in 
NEW HISTORIES OF GUN RIGHTS AND REGULATIONS: ESSAYS ON THE PLACE OF GUNS IN 
COPYRIGHT © 2021 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
2021] History of Firearms Public Carry Regulation 173 
However, the most famous cases of enforcement of the law actually came in 
efforts to prevent the return of black residents to slavery.26 In the 1850s, on at 
least two occasions, local officials arrested and prosecuted U.S. Marshals—who 
were pursuing escaped slaves—for carrying weapons, although they were 
eventually cleared because of their position.27 These are examples of gun 
regulations being used to protect Black Americans. 
Northerners and especially abolitionists often criticized Southerners for the 
frequency with which they carried arms, and tied carrying weapons to the need 
to oppress enslaved persons.28 In an 1846 speech, abolitionist and future Senator 
Charles Sumner, whom the Supreme Court quoted at length in District of 
Columbia v. Heller,29 compared the South, where “mortal affrays [were] so 
frequent” because “it [was] supposed essential to personal safety to go armed 
with pistols and bowie-knives,” with the North and East where few murders 
occurred because people were “unprovided with such facilities for taking life.”30 
The Ohio Anti-Slavery Bugle discussed “the style of civilization that slavery 
creates” where “the people go armed” and “a murder in a private fight makes 
less sensation than the escape of a negro.”31 A speech published in the Boston 
Liberator attributed the need for slaveholders to “go armed with a dirk and 
pistol” to the guilt of slavery.32 
Ironically, the antebellum South is another area where we can be confident 
certain gun laws were not enacted with racist intent.33 These states were not 
subtle about their racist laws and enacted explicit prohibitions known as “Slave 
Codes” or “Black Codes” on enslaved persons and free blacks engaging in a 
variety of activities, including possessing firearms.34 In addition to the racist 
 
AMERICAN LAW AND SOCIETY 1, 15 (Joseph Blocher, Jacob D. Charles & Darrell A.H. Miller eds., 
forthcoming) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3697761 [https://perma.cc/2CT6-SPN2]. 
 26.  See Brief of Amicus Curiae Mountain States Legal Foundation’s Center to Keep and Bear 
Arms in Support of Petitioners at 26–29, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, No. 20-843 
(U.S. July 16, 2021), 2021 WL 3072866. 
 27.  Mr. Hughes’ Statement, RICHMOND WHIG AND PUB. ADVERTISER, Nov. 29, 1850, at 1; 
Disturbance in Worcester, SALEM REG., Nov. 2, 1854, at 2. 
 28.  Claims of Millions South, BOS. RECORDER, Oct. 17, 1844 (describing southern society as 
a military camp: “I, my sons, my drivers, go armed; my bed chambers are military arsenals, my 
pistols lie beneath my pillow . . . .”); From Washington, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., June 6, 1856, at 6 
(“Now we take it that no such doctrine as this could be born into being anywhere out of a region 
where it was thought perfectly proper for every legislator to go armed and to take the defense of 
his own person, and the avenging of his own wrongs, into his own hands.”); Letter to the Editor, 
WKLY. DEMOCRATIC STATESMAN (Austin, Tex.), Dec. 31, 1874, at 3 (“[I]t might not mean 
anything for a man in Massachusetts, when he had an altercation, to put his hands under his coat 
tail, but that in South Carolina it might mean a good deal.”). 
 29.  554 U.S. 570, 609 (2008). 
 30.  CHARLES SUMNER, EXTRACTS FROM “THE TRUE GRANDEUR OF NATIONS;” AN 
ORATION 25 (Liverpool, D. Marples, Lord Street 1846). 
 31.  Copious Illustrations, ANTI-SLAVERY BUGLE (New Lisbon, Ohio), July 7, 1860, at 2. 
 32.  Speech of Rev. Perry, LIBERATOR (Bos., Mass.), Jan. 18, 1834, at 11. 
 33.  See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, “Never Intended to Be Applied to the 
White Population”: Firearms Regulation and Racial Disparity—The Redeemed South’s Legacy to 
a National Jurisprudence?, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1307, 1320–21 (1995) (discussing the 
distinction between southern laws targeting enslaved persons and free blacks and laws applying to 
the white population). 
 34.  See Race and Slavery Based, Repository of Historical Gun Laws, supra note 6. 
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laws, these states also enacted racially neutral, complete prohibitions on carrying 
concealed weapons.35 This was close to a complete prohibition on carrying arms 
in public because carrying guns concealed was the norm as opposed to “the 
extremely unusual case of the carrying of such weapon in full open view.”36 
These laws were both frequently broken by and consistently enforced against 
the white population.37 
After the Civil War, many southern states adopted Black Codes limiting the 
liberties of Freedmen, which were intended to restore slavery in all but name.38 
Among the restrictions were prohibitions on Freedmen possessing or carrying 
firearms, or serving in the militia.39 Radical Republicans and Freedmen railed 
against these discriminatory restrictions.40 When Congress imposed military 
governments on southern states during Reconstruction, those governments were 
quick to do away with these racist laws.41 
Notably, while the Radical Republicans repealed facially discriminatory gun 
laws, they did not oppose gun regulation generally. For example, while gun 
rights activists frequently cite Reconstruction General Dan Sickles’s General 
Order No. 1, which removed prohibitions on gun possession by Freedmen in 
North and South Carolina, they fail to mention Sickles’s subsequent General 
Order No. 10, which completely prohibited carrying firearms in the states.42 
 
 35.  See, e.g., An Act Against Carrying Concealed Weapons, and Going Armed in Public 
Places in an Unnecessary Manner, § 1, 1813 La. Acts 172, 172–73; An Act to Prevent Persons in 
This Commonwealth from Wearing Concealed Arms, Except in Certain Cases, ch. 89, § 1, 1813 
Ky. Acts 100, 100–01; Act of Mar. 10, 1838, ch. 44, § 13, 1838 Ark. Acts 278, 280; An Act to 
Prevent Any Person in This Territory from Carrying Arms Secretly, ch. 860, No. 38, 1835 Fla. 
Laws 423; Act of Dec. 19, 1861, § 4413, 1861 Ga. Laws 856, 859. 
 36.  State v. Smith, 11 La. Ann. 633, 634 (1856); R.S. Morrison, Carrying Concealed 
Weapons, in THE COLORADO LAW REPORTER 277, 278 (Denver, Pierson & Gardner 1884) (“[I]t 
is a practical disarmament where a man is not allowed to carry such weapon in the only way which 
common sense allows it to be carried. No one but a fool will parade the streets with a revolver 
outside the person . . . .”); Presentment of the Grand Jury, WKLY. UNION TIMES (Union, S.C.), 
June 25, 1880, at 2 (“It is apparent to every good citizen and man of sense, that any gentleman 
would blush and feel deply [sic] ashamed to be caught parading the streets on a public occasion, 
or, for the matter of that, on a private occasion, with a revolver swinging around his neck like a 
powder horn, or sticking vulgarly and threateningly out of his hip pocket, making him a picture of 
a pirate.”). 
 37.  See, e.g., Hall v. State, 9 Ala. 827, 832–33 (1846) (discussing forfeiture of surety bond 
imposed under Alabama law prohibiting carrying concealed weapons without an immediate need 
for self-defense); State v. Click, 2 Ala. 26, 28–29 (1841); BATON ROUGE GAZETTE, Mar. 8, 1845, 
at 2 (discussing a man fined $20 and made to provide a $500 peace bond after his conviction for 
carrying concealed weapons); Assault with Dangerous Weapons, DAILY CRESCENT (New Orleans, 
La.), Apr. 26, 1848, at 3 (discussing a man fined $5 for carrying a concealed knife); Fined, 
MEMPHIS DAILY APPEAL, Dec. 1, 1857, at 3 (reporting on a prosecution in St. Louis for carrying 
concealed weapons). 
 38.  See ANDERSON, supra note 7, at 86. 
 39.  See, e.g., id.; An Act to Punish Certain Offences Therein Named, and for Other Purposes, 
ch. 23, § 1, 1865 Miss. Laws 165, 165; see also Amicus Brief for NAAGA, supra note 3, at 19–20. 
 40.  ANDERSON, supra note 7, at 86. 
 41.  See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 908–09 (1866). 
 42.  Amicus Brief for NAAGA, supra note 3, at 19–20; Headquarters Second Military District, 
General Orders No. 10 (Apr. 11, 1867), in A POLITICAL MANUAL FOR 1867, 202, 204 (D.C., Philp 
& Solomons 1867) (“The practice of carrying deadly weapons, except by officers and soldiers in 
the military service of the United States, is prohibited. The concealment of such weapons on the 
person will be deemed an aggravation of the offence.”). 
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Other military governors issued similar orders prohibiting carrying concealed 
weapons or regulating the carrying of weapons at public gatherings.43 
When southern states elected new Republican-controlled governments, which 
included many Freedmen, they enacted laws regulating public carry to protect 
Freedmen from the extreme levels of racist violence from groups like the Klu 
Klux Klan. South Carolina enacted a version of the Statute of Northampton.44 
This law was understood as a prohibition on carrying weapons in public.45 
Georgia prohibited carrying weapons at public assemblies.46 Louisiana passed a 
law prohibiting carrying weapons on or near voting sites.47 And Kentucky 
passed a prohibition on carrying concealed weapons with an exception for those 
facing specific threats.48 
The most instructive example of Reconstruction gun legislation came from 
Texas. In 1871, the Republican-controlled state legislature passed a law 
prohibiting carrying handguns and many other weapons in public without a 
specific threat to a person’s safety.49 Notably, all twelve of the state assembly’s 
Black members and both of the state’s Black senators supported passage of the 
law.50 “[O]pposition to the law consisted primarily of Democrats, and 
conservative Republicans, who had served in the Confederate Army.”51 The law 
was enforced by a multiracial police force and helped bring a level of calm to 
Texas.52 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Congress enacted a public carry 
 
 43.  Headquarters, District of Louisiana, General Orders No. 11 (Sept. 16, 1867), 
OPELOUSAS COURIER (St. Landry, La.), Sept. 21, 1867, at 1 (prohibiting “the assembling of armed 
men for political[] or other purposes” and “post[ing] [them] as sentinels”); Headquarters, Fourth 
Military District, General Order No. 28 (Sept. 9, 1867), WKLY. PANOLA STAR (Panola, Miss.), 
Sept. 21, 1867, at 2 (broadly prohibiting carrying concealed weapons). 
 44.  An Act to Define the Criminal Jurisdiction of Trial Justices, No. 288, § 4, 1870 S.C. Acts 
402, 402–03. 
 45.  Concealed Weapons, YORKVILLE ENQUIRER (S.C.), Apr. 28, 1870, at 2 (describing a 
judge stating the1870 law will satisfy the state’s need for a law prohibiting concealed carry). 
 46.  ORVILLE PARK, PARK’S ANNOTATED CODE OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 1914, Vol. 6, 
Penal Code, 9th div., art. 3, § 348 (§ 342). 
 47.  An Act to Regulate the Conduct and to Maintain the Freedom and Purity of Elections, 
No. 100, § 73, 1870 La. Acts 145, 159–60. 
 48.  An Act to Prohibit the Carrying of Concealed Deadly Weapons, ch. 1888, §§ 1–2, 5, 1871 
Ky. Acts 89, 89–90. Because Kentucky never left the Union, it was not subject to Reconstruction 
in the manner of the Confederate states. The 1871 law was passed during the relatively progressive 
administration of Democratic Governor Preston Leslie who also succeeded in repealing the 
prohibition on blacks testifying in court and established an education system for Freedmen and 
black children. Gov. Preston Hopkins Leslie, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, 
https://www.nga.org/governor/preston-hopkins-leslie/ [https://perma.cc/JC5E-2EDW]. 
 49.  An Act to Regulate the Keeping and Bearing of Deadly Weapons, 12th Leg., R.S., ch. 34, 
§ 1, 1871 Tex. Gen. Laws 25. 
 50.  Mark Anthony Frassetto, The Law and Politics of Firearms Regulation in Reconstruction 
Texas, 4 TEX. A&M L. REV. 95, 106 (2016). 
 51.  Id. at 106–07. 
 52.  Id. at 103, 107; see also Brennan Gardner Rivas, Enforcement of Public Carry 
Restrictions: Texas as a Case Study, U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2022) (manuscript at 
5–6, 10–12), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3941466 [https://perma.cc/X9JT-TVMC] (examining 
Texas public-carry-enforcement records and finding race neutral enforcement from 1870 to 1890 
and increasing racial disparities beginning in the 1890s following the collapse of Black political 
power). 
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licensing law for Washington, D.C.53 The law was modeled after the 1871 Texas 
law, limiting the issuance of concealed carry permits to those who could show 
“necessity” to carry a weapon.54 The law was supported primarily by 
Northerners and Republicans, while opposition came almost exclusively from 
Southerners, who had spent the prior decades enacting the structures of Jim 
Crow in their states.55 
In 1906, Massachusetts passed a public carry licensing law like that adopted 
in D.C. and similar to the 1836 Massachusetts law already in effect.56 New York 
State adopted the same public carry licensing standard in 1913.57 The 1913 New 
York law—which is the law at issue in Bruen—expanded statewide the need-
based licensing standard for concealed carry that had existed in New York City 
since 1881.58 
Some gun rights proponents have argued that the 1913 New York law was 
motivated by anti-Italian sentiments.59 These claims confusingly focus on the 
allegedly anti-Italian motivations of the 1911 Sullivan Act, which required a 
permit to purchase and possess handguns, rather than the 1913 public carry 
law.60 Presumably, the argument goes that if New York passed an anti-Italian 
gun law in 1911, a law passed in 1913 must also have been anti-Italian. This 
does not make a lot of sense given that most New York Italians would have 
already been subject to public carry restrictions from the 1881 New York City 
law.61 The 1913 Act also appears to have been passed, at least in part, to limit 
the discretion of law enforcement to deny licenses to possess firearms as well as 
to carry for those who showed an actual need.62 And in any event, while anti-
 
 53.  An Act to Punish the Carrying or Selling of Deadly or Dangerous Weapons Within the 
District of Columbia, and for Other Purposes, ch. 159, 27 Stat. 116 (1892). 
 54.  22 CONG. REC. 228–29 (1890) (statement of Rep. Grosvenor); id. at 229 (statement of 
Rep. Lanham). 
 55.  Mark Anthony Frassetto, The First Congressional Debate on Public Carry and What it 
Tells Us About Firearm Regionalism, 40 CAMPBELL L. REV. 335, 351–52 (2018) (highlighting that 
the only Republican vote against the bill came from Connecticut, the heart of the firearms industry 
at the time). 
 56.  An Act to Regulate by License the Carrying of Concealed Weapons, ch. 172, 1906 Mass. 
Acts 150; see also Acts of Feb. 1836, ch. 134, § 16, 1836 Mass. Laws 748, 750. 
 57.  An Act to Amend the Penal Law Generally, in Relation to the Carrying, Use and Sale of 
Dangerous Weapons, ch. 608, 1913 N.Y. Laws 1627–30. 
 58.  N.Y.C., N.Y., ORDINANCES art. 27, §§ 264–65 (1881). 
 59.  See, e.g., Amici Curiae Brief of Italo-American Jurists & Attorneys in Support of 
Petitioners at 1, 27–29, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol. Ass’n v. Bruen, No. 20-843 (U.S. July 15, 2021), 
2021 WL 3072816 [hereinafter Amici Brief of Italo-American Jurists]; The Racist History of 
Handgun Bans in America, NRA-ILA (Jan. 15, 2003), 
https://www.nraila.org/articles/20030115/the-racist-history-of-handgun-bans-in-a 
[https://perma.cc/X7XJ-WN8M] (“The law was aimed at preventing handgun ownership by Italians 
and Irish immigrants of the period, then considered untrustworthy by New York legislators and 
police chiefs with different bloodlines.”). 
 60.  Amici Brief of Italo-American Jurists, supra note 59, at 1–3, 19–20. 
 61.  ORDINANCES art. 27, §§ 264–67. 
 62.  Dangerous Weapons Act: Senator Foley Explains How He Would Protect Householders, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1913, at 10; Pistol Law Amended: Magistrate Required to Issue Permits 
Where Arms Are Necessary, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1913, at 9 (“It requires Magistrates to issue 
licenses for carrying concealed weapons . . . to persons of good moral character when they show 
that it is necessary for them to be armed.”). 
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Italian sentiment was real during the period, other factors clearly motivated 
passage of the Sullivan Act and the 1913 law.63 One of the most immediate 
causes of the Sullivan Act’s passage was the high-profile murder of novelist 
David Graham Phillips, who was gunned down in front of the Princeton Club, 
in a murder-suicide by a delusional man who believed Phillips had used his sister 
as the model for the heroine in one of his novels.64 That, combined with a 
doubling of the city’s homicide rate65 and an assassination attempt on New York 
Mayor William Gaynor in Hoboken a year earlier, resulted in broad support for 
stricter firearms laws.66 
The standard adopted in the early twentieth century in D.C., Massachusetts, 
and New York was then adopted by the United States Revolver Association 
(USRA) in 1923 as part of a model law drafted by USRA President and National 
Rifle Association (NRA) Vice President Karl Frederick, a lawyer and Olympic 
gold medalist in pistol shooting.67 Frederick drafted the model law, including 
the public carry licensing provision, in an effort to deter more states from 
enacting laws requiring a permit to purchase or possess handguns, which had 
been adopted in several states across the country.68 Licensing public carry, as 
opposed to licensing possession, was fairly uncontroversial at the time.69 The 
model law was eventually adopted by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (now the Uniform Law Commission) 
and was enacted in states across the country in part because of lobbying by the 
newly politically active NRA.70 These laws remained in effect across the United 
States until the late 1980s when the NRA began its efforts to deregulate public 
carry.71 
 
 63.  See Patrick J. Charles, A Historian’s Assessment of the Anti-Immigrant Narrative in 
NYSRPA v. Bruen, DUKE CTR. FOR FIREARMS L. (Aug. 4, 2021), 
https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/2021/08/a-historians-assessment-of-the-anti-immigrant-narrative-in-
nysrpa-v-bruen/ [https://perma.cc/56JQ-8YY4] (critiquing the argument that anti-Italian sentiment 
motivated passage of the Sullivan Act). Charles points out that the claim that Italians made up 70% 
of prosecutions for violating the act in the early years appears to be completely unsupported. Id. 
 64.  CHARLES, supra note 7, at 175. 
 65.  ERIC H. MONKKONEN, MURDER IN NEW YORK CITY 21 (2001). At the turn of the century, 
the homicide rate in New York was around 3 per 100,000; at the time of the Sullivan Act, it 
approached 6. Id. During prohibition, it approached 10; during the crack epidemic of the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, it exceeded 25. Id. 
 66.  Story of Shooting Told by Witnesses, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1910, at 3. 
 67.  Charles V. Imlay, The Uniform Firearms Act, 12 A.B.A. J. 767, 767–68 (1926); 
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING 571, 573 (1926); Paul Hicks, A Bit of 
Local History, RYE REC. (Mar. 19, 2017), https://ryerecord.com/a-bit-of-rye-history/ 
[https://perma.cc/L6XQ-AX5U]. 
 68.  Imlay, supra note 67. 
 69.  HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE 
LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING 718–19 (1924). 
 70.  Imlay, supra note 67, at 767; Note, Sportsmen Fight Sullivan Law, 23 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 665, 665 (1932). 
 71.  See Gun Law Navigator, Permitting Process, EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, 
https://maps.everytown.org/navigator/trends.html?dataset=permitting_process 
[https://perma.cc/JXA8-UWA4]; Richard S. Grossman & Stephen A. Lee, May Issue Versus Shall 
Issue: Explaining the Pattern of Concealed-Carry Handgun Laws, 1960–2001, 26 CONTEMP. 
ECON. POL’Y 198, 199–202 (2008). 
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In short, the long history of gun regulation, dating back to the 1328 Statute of 
Northampton, is overwhelmingly race-neutral, with each new model of 
regulation based on nonracially motivated predecessors. Racist laws certainly 
existed—primarily in the South—but they stood outside of the clear historical 
line of American gun regulation. 
III. ORIGINALISM AND ODIOUS HISTORICAL LAWS 
Faced with the actual historical record of nonracist gun laws, gun rights 
advocates and scholars appear to cherry-pick historical racist gun laws primarily 
for rhetorical effect. They essentially argue that all current firearms regulations 
are illegitimate because some racist gun laws existed in the past.72 More 
charitably, they make a quasi-equal-protection claim that the racist intent of 
some historical laws carries forward to today’s gun laws.73 They technically get 
one thing right—expressly racist historical laws from the American South 
should not be used to justify modern gun regulation—but they fundamentally 
misconstrue why. 
Gun rights advocates primarily focus on two types of laws in particular: 
antebellum Slave and Black Codes, and early Reconstruction Black Codes. 
Slave Codes prohibited enslaved persons from doing virtually anything without 
their owners’ consent, including possessing firearms,74 while antebellum Black 
Codes drastically limited the ability of free blacks to travel between cities and 
states, enforce contracts, vote and testify in trials, and possess and carry 
firearms.75 Black Codes existed in many states, but weapon restrictions appear 
to have been mostly limited to the South.76 After the Civil War, many former 
Confederate States readopted Black Codes regulating Freedmen, which severely 
limited Freedmen’s ability to contract, own land, participate in civic society, and 
possess and carry firearms.77 
Modern originalism, including that applied by the Supreme Court in Heller, 
looks to the original public understanding of the scope of a constitutional 
provision.78 In Heller, the Court looked to the historical scope of firearms 
 
 72.  See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 2, 10–13; see also Amicus Brief for NAAGA, 
supra note 3, at 4–11; Nicholas Gallo, Misfire: How the North Carolina Pistol Purchase Permit 
System Misses the Mark of Constitutional Muster and Effectiveness, 99 N.C. L. REV. 529, 533–36 
(2021) (haphazardly discussing racist gun laws in an attempt to stain gun regulation generally as 
racist). 
 73.  See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263–67 (1977). 
 74.  CHARLES, supra note 6, at 3–4, 12–13. 
 75.  Id. at 12–13; see also MASUR, supra note 18, at 16–18. 
 76.  See generally, Race and Slavery Based, Repository of Historical Gun Laws, supra note 6; 
Notable exceptions include New Jersey, Indiana, and a town in Iowa. Act of 1752, ch. 112, § 4, 
1752 N.J. Laws 443, 444 (New Jersey was a slave state at the time); A Law Entitled a Law 
Respecting Slaves, § 4, 1804 Ind. Acts 108, DUKE CTR. FOR FIREARMS L., 
https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1804-ind-acts-108-a-law-entitled-a-law-respecting-slaves-
%C2%A7-4/ [https://perma.cc/C687-9XNM]; VINCENNES, IOWA, AN ORDINANCE TO PREVENT 
NUISANCE, ETC. ch. 21, § 7 (1819). 
 77.  CHARLES, supra note 6, at 10–12. 
 78.  Lawrence B. Solum, What is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist 
Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
12, 23 (2011). 
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regulations to assess this historical understanding of the Second Amendment.79 
The expressly racist Southern laws should not be considered when assessing the 
original public understanding of the Second Amendment.80 These 
discriminatory gun laws arose out of a view of Blacks and Black citizenship, 
most clearly embodied in the anticanonical Supreme Court decision in Scott v. 
Sanford, which rejected Black people as full citizens.81 This view was ultimately 
rejected by the ratification of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments, which extended the rights of American citizenship to Black 
men.82 The Southern gun laws were enacted with an antiquated, and ultimately 
rejected, race-based view of citizenship and rights. In this view, Blacks fell 
outside of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment.83 Regulations 
based on this rejected view of Black citizenship thus have no role to play in the 
originalist analysis.84 
For the same reasons, a law passed with facially neutral language but intended 
only to be enforced against a group wrongly considered outside of the people 
would provide little guidance about the scope of the Second Amendment right.85 
If these kinds of regulations were the sole historical support for New York’s 
challenged law, the originalist argument for upholding the law would be quite 
weak.86 
Fortunately, as this article has shown, gun laws stained by bias were not the 
rule in American history. There is a tradition of public carry regulations that 
were race neutral, enacted and enforced to protect Black people, or only 
regulated white people. This is the tradition that became New York’s law and 
 
 79.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–28 (2008). 
 80.  See id. at 614. 
 81.  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404 (1857). 
 82.  U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, § 1, XIV, § 1, XV, § 1. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 163–294 (1998) (discussing the passage, 
ratification, and meaning of the Reconstruction Amendments). 
 83.  See U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 84.  Gun rights scholar Stephen Halbrook offers a more sophisticated claim, arguing that 
Black Code restrictions are key to interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment because they 
distinguished between “[f]ree citizens [who] had a right to carry arms [and] slaves [who] did not.” 
Stephen P. Halbrook., Faux Histoire of the Right to Bear Arms: Young v. Hawaii (9th Cir. 2021), 
INDEP. INST., at 34 (July 14, 2021), 
https://www.independent.org/publications/article.asp?id=13662 [https://perma.cc/K73U-QUDT]. 
This argument is undermined by the historical record, which shows the repeal of the Black Codes 
followed by the enactment of general carry restrictions. See infra Part II. 
 85.  Gun rights advocates often cite a Florida law requiring a license to possess certain 
firearms as an example of this type of law. See Amicus Brief for NAAGA, supra note 3, at 27–28 
(discussing 1893 Fla. Laws 71–72). They cite to a concurring opinion in Watson v. Stone, in which 
one of the Justices said the law was “never intended to be applied to the white population.” Id. at 
28 (quoting Watson v. Stone, 4 So. 2d 700, 703 (Fla. 1941) (Buford, J., concurring)). The author is 
skeptical that Justice Buford paid close attention to the actions of the Florida state legislature as a 
fifteen-year-old in 1893, but not that there would have been discriminatory enforcement in the Jim 
Crow South. See Justice Rivers Henderson Buford, FLA. SUP. CT., 
https://www.floridasupremecourt.org/Justices/Former-Justices/Justice-Rivers-Henderson-Buford 
[https://perma.cc/SVF7-8T2R] (Dec. 4, 2020) (providing Justice Buford’s biography). 
 86.  On the other hand, laws passed that were intended to apply to everyone, but had a 
disparate impact in how they were enforced, would still be relevant in assessing the historical 
understanding of the scope of the right because they were intended to apply to the people. 
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formed the basis for modern gun regulation. The Court should reject 
consideration of the racist laws of the antebellum and early Reconstruction 
South and look to this broader tradition as the basis for the scope of acceptable 
regulation under the Second Amendment. 
 
